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Abstract. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) enables an access control
mechanism over encrypted data by specifying access policies over at-
tributes associated with private keys or ciphertexts, which is a promising
solution to protect data privacy in cloud storage services. As an encryp-
tion system that involves many data users whose attributes might change
over time, it is essential to provide a mechanism to selectively revoke data
users’ attributes in an ABE system. However, most of the previous revok-
able ABE schemes consider how to disable revoked data users to access
(newly) encrypted data in the system, and there are few of them that
can be used to revoke one or more attributes of a data user while keep-
ing this user active in the system. Due to this observation, in this paper,
we focus on designing ABE schemes supporting selective revocation, i.e.,
a data user’s attributes can be selectively revoked, which we call ABE
with granular revocation (ABE-GR). Our idea is to utilize the key sepa-
ration technique, such that for any data user, key elements corresponding
to his/her attributes are generated separately but are linkable to each
other. To begin with, we give a basic ABE-GR scheme to accomplish
selective revocation using the binary tree data structure. Then, to fur-
ther improve the efficiency, we present a server-aided ABE-GR scheme,
where an untrusted server is introduced to the system to mitigate data
users’ workloads during the key update phase. Both of the ABE-GR con-
structions are formally proved to be secure under our defined security
model.
Key words: Granular revocation, ABE, Efficiency, Cloud storage
1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [21] provides a promising solution to preserve
data privacy in a scenario (e.g., cloud storage services [23]) where data users are
identified by their attributes (or credentials), and data owners want to share
their data according to some policy based on the attributes of data users. In
a ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) system, each data user is given a private
attribute-key reflecting his/her attributes generated by the attribute authority
(AA), and each data owner specifies an access policy to the message over a set
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of attributes1. A data user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if
the attributes ascribed to his/her private attribute-key satisfy the access policy
(or access structure) associated with the ciphertext. Though ABE favorably
solves the problem arising in the situations where different users with different
attributes are given access to different levels of the encrypted data, it fails to
address the issue of dynamic credentials where the attributes of every data user
change with time. This challenge motivates the study of revocation mechanisms
[1], where a periodical key update process disables revoked data users to update
their decryption keys to decrypt newly encrypted data.
In terms of attribute-based setting, user revocation is divided into indirect
revocation and direct revocation [1]. Regarding indirect revocation, one solution
is to ask data users to periodically renew their private attribute-keys [7], but this
requires the update key size to be O(N−R) group elements where N is the num-
ber of all users and R is the number of revoked users. To reduce the cost of key
update from linear to logarithmic (i.e., O(R log(NR ))), Boldyreva, Goyal and Ku-
mar [5] put forth a revocation methodology by combining the fuzzy IBE scheme
[21] with the binary tree data structure [18] where the AA publicly broadcasts
the key update information for each time period, but only non-revoked data users
can update their decryption keys to decrypt a newly generated ciphertext. In
direct revocation [2, 1], data owners possess a current revocation list, and specify
the revocation list directly when running the encrypting algorithm so that user
revocation can be done instantly without requiring the key update phase as in
the indirect method2. There are also constructions (e.g., [25]) that delegate the
direct revocation ability to a semi-trusted server who cannot collude with the
data users, where the server helps data users with decryption but terminates the
decryption operation for any revoked data user.
Since an attribute-based encryption system might involve a large number
of data users whose attributes change over time, it is desirable to build an
attribute-based encryption scheme that the credentials possessed by data users
can be selectively revoked. However, most of the previous revocable ABE sys-
tems [5, 2, 1, 20, 25] only consider efficient user revocation to prevent revoked
data users from accessing the encrypted data, and there is little attention on how
to independently revoke one or more attributes from a data user, i.e., selective
revocation on attributes. Due to this observation, in this paper, we focus on the
design of efficient and revocable attribute-based encryption schemes where the
1 There are two complimentary forms of ABE: CP-ABE and key-policy ABE (KP-
ABE). In a KP-ABE system, the situation is reversed that the keys are associated
with the access policies and the ciphertexts are associated with the attributes. In
the rest of this paper, unless otherwise specified, what we talk about is CP-ABE.
2 Note that direct revocation can be done immediately without the key update process
which asks for the communication from the AA to all the non-revoked users over
all the time periods, but it requires all the data owners to keep the current revoca-
tion list. This makes the system impurely attribute-based, since data owners in the
attribute-based setting create ciphertext based only on attributes without caring
revocation. In this paper, unless otherwise specified, the revocation mechanism we
talk about is indirect revocation.
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attributes possessed by each data user can be selectively revoked via a periodical
key update phase, which we call attribute-based encryption with granular revo-
cation (ABE-GR). Notice that ABE-GR can achieve user revocation by revoking
all credentials possessed by a data user.
1.1 Our Contributions
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Fig. 1: System architectures of ABE-GR (left) and server-aided ABE-GR (right).
We describe the system architecture of an ABE-GR scheme in Fig. 1-(a).
In an ABE-GR system, each data user’s key is divided into three parts: private
user-key (with a corresponding public user-key), private attribute-keys (asso-
ciated with different attributes) and public key update information, from the
latter two of which a data user can extract a decryption key. The AA, who keeps
the master private key and publishes the public parameter, is responsible for
the distribution of personalized pairs of public and private user-keys and private
attribute-keys. In addition, the AA regularly posts the public key update infor-
mation. Each data owner encrypts a message under an access structure and a
time period using the public parameter. To decrypt a newly generated cipher-
text, a data user needs to possess a pair of public and private user-keys as well as
a decryption key on the current time period satisfying the access policy of this
ciphertext. The key challenge in building an ABE-GR scheme is to prevent a
data user from using his/her revoked attributes to decrypt any newly generated
ciphertext. Traditionally, in an ABE scheme, each attribute possessed by a data
user corresponds to one element in his/her private attribute-key, and these key
elements are tied together through a random value. In order to support granular
revocation in ABE, we need a technique to enable different key components on
different attributes to be created separately but linkable to each other. Thanks
to the key separation technique in distributed ABE [17] where the task of the
single AA is split across multiple AAs and each attribute is controlled by one
specific AA, we can equip an ABE scheme with a similar technique but under
a single AA. Thus, each key component associated with the corresponding at-
tribute will be created separately, but they still bind together due to the sharing
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of the same identification information (i.e., the public user-key) which is unique
to each data user. As a result, we build an ABE-GR scheme by combining an
ABE scheme with the key separation technique in distributed ABE [17]. To re-
duce the size of key update for the AA from linear to logarithmic in the number
of users, we apply the binary tree data structure [18] in the algorithms of our
ABE-GR scheme. Details about this ABE-GR scheme, which we will refer to as
a basic ABE-GR scheme, is given in Section 4.
As alluded in [19], binary tree data structure [18] is useful in alleviating
the workload of the AA, but it could not mitigate the workload of each data
user who needs to periodically update the decryption key. Is it possible to fix
the keys stored by data users such that they are not required to frequently
update their decryption keys while without affecting the revocation? To give an
affirmative answer to this question, we bring in an untrusted server3 to the basic
ABE-GR system to mitigate the workloads of data users. We depict the system
architecture in Fig. 1-(b), which involves four entities: an AA, data owners, data
users, and a server. Different from that in the basic ABE-GR construction, the
public and private user-key pair is divided into a pair of public and private
user-user-keys and a pair of public and private authority-user-keys, of which
the former is generated by each data user himself/herself4 and the latter is
extracted by the AA based on the public user-user-key. The server is given the
public and private authority-user-keys and private attribute-keys of data users
as well as the key update information. A data user fetches a ciphertext from
the cloud, and sends it to the server for partial decryption. For any non-revoked
user, from the private attribute-keys and key update information, the server can
generate a collection of decryption keys (associated with a set of attributes),
which, combining with the public and private authority-user-keys, can partially
decrypt a ciphertext forwarded by this user if his/her non-revoked attributes
satisfy the access structure ascribed to the ciphertext. A data user can obtain
the plaintext by decrypting the partially decrypted ciphertext using his/her self-
generated private user-user-key. This does not compromise the security, because
the public user-user-key is embedded in the private authority-user-key, the server
cannot fully unwrap the ciphertext without the private user-user-key. A detailed
description of the construction is presented in Section 4.
Since both our constructions are built on an ABE scheme that is selectively
secure [24, 17], where the adversary has to commit the challenge access structure
in advance, we can only achieve selective security in our ABE-GR schemes. Note
that the techniques can be applied to fully secure ABE schemes (e.g., [20]) to
obtain fully secure (server-aided) ABE-GR schemes.
3 The server is untrusted in the sense that it honestly follows the protocol but without
holding any secret information (i.e., it may collude with data users). Besides, all
operations done by the server can be performed by anyone, including data users
(i.e., any dishonest behaviour from the server can be easily detected).
4 This pair of user-user-keys can also be generated by the AA, but this requires a
secure channel between each data user and the AA for private key distribution.
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1.2 Related Work
Revocable IBE. With regard to revocable IBE, Boneh and Franklin [7] sug-
gested that users renew their private keys periodically, but this requires that
all users have to regularly contact the key generation centre (KGC) to obtain
new private keys, and a secure channel must be established between the KGC
and each user for such transactions. Hanaoka et al. [10] presented a convenient
method for the users to periodically renew their private keys without interact-
ing with the KGC, where the KGC publicly posts the key update information.
However, each user needs to posses a tamper-resistant hardware device, making
the solution very cumbersome. Boldyreva, Goyal and Kumar [5] presented an
efficient revocable IBE scheme to reduce the size of key update from linear to
logarithmic, but all non-revoked users need to periodically update their decryp-
tion keys. To better address the revocation issue, revocation with a third party
[6, 9, 16, 3, 15, 13, 19] has been proposed, where a semi-trusted5 (or untrusted)
third party is assigned to hold the shares of all users’ private keys and help users
decrypt each ciphertext. Once an identity is revoked, the mediator stops helping
the user with decryption.
Revocable ABE. Regarding user revocation in ABE, there are two re-
vocation mechanisms [1, 8]: direct and indirect revocation. Considering direct
revocation, in which data owners keep the current revocation list, and specify
the revocation list directly when encrypting, there are schemes in [2, 14, 11]. In
addition, Yang et al. [25] proposed an approach by asking a semi-trusted server
to share the decryption capability with data users, and thus when a data user
is revoked, the server terminates the decryption for the user. Regarding indirect
revocation, which we intend to achieve in this paper, Boldyreva, Goyal and Ku-
mar [5] proposed a revocable KP-ABE scheme where the AA indirectly enables
the revocation by forcing revoked users to be unable to update their keys. Later,
based on the same technique adopted in [5], Attrapadung and Imai [1] raised a
hybrid revocable KP-ABE system under selective security model which allows
a data owner to select whether to use either direct or indirect revocation mode
when encrypting a message. Sahai, Seyalioglu and Waters [20] provided a generic
way to build ABE schemes supporting dynamic credentials, where the AA indi-
rectly accomplishes revocation by stopping updating the keys for revoked users.
Cui and Deng [8] gave two indirectly revocable and decentralized ABE schemes
in composite-order groups where the AA’role is split across multiple AAs.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review
the notions and definitions relevant to this paper. In Section 3, we describe the
framework for ABE-GR, and then present its security model. In Section 4, we
5 In this paper, unless otherwise specified, “semi-trusted” means that the security
is guaranteed under the assumption that the corresponding entity is disallowed to
collude with the malicious data users.
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give two concrete constructions of ABE-GR, and provably reduce their security.
In addition, we compare our ABE-GR schemes with previous revocable ABE
schemes in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some basic cryptographic notions and definitions that
are to be used in this paper.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings and Complexity Assumptions
Let p be a prime number, and G be a group of order p that is generated from g.
We define eˆ : G×G → G1 to be a bilinear map if it has two properties [7].
– Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab.
– Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operation in G is efficiently
computable and there exists a group G1 and an efficiently computable bilinear
map eˆ : G×G→ G1 as above.
Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption
[24]. The decisional q-parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (BDHE) problem
is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, given −→y =
g, gµ, ga, ..., ga
q
, ga
q+2
, ..., ga
2q
,
∀ j ∈ [1, q] gµ·bj , ga/bj , ..., gaq/bj , gaq+2/bj , ..., ga2q/bj ,
∀1 ≤ j, k ≤ q, k 6= j ga·µ·bk/bj , ..., gaq·µ·bk/bj ,
it is difficult to distinguish (−→y , eˆ(g, g)aq+1µ) from (−→y , Z), where g ∈ G, Z ∈ G1,
a, µ, b1, ..., bq ∈ Zp are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
2.2 Access Structures and Linear Secret Sharing
Definition 1. (Access Structure [12, 24]). Let {P1, ..., Pn} be a set of par-
ties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B, C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C,
then C ⊆ A. A monotone access structure is a monotone collection A of non-
empty subsets of {P1, ..., Pn}, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn}\{∅}. The sets in A are called
the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
Definition 2. (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [12, 24]). Let P
be a set of parties. Let M be a matrix of size l × n. Let ρ : {1, ..., l} → P be
a function that maps a row to a party for labeling. A secret sharing scheme Π
over a set of parties P is a linear secret-sharing scheme over Zp if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
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2. There exists a matrix M which has l rows and n columns called the share-
generating matrix for Π. For x = 1, ..., l, the x-th row of matrix M is labeled
by a party ρ(i), where ρ : {1, ..., l} → P is a function that maps a row to a
party for labeling. Considering that the column vector −→v = (µ, r2, ..., rn),
where µ ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2, ..., rn ∈ Zp are randomly
chosen, then M−→v is the vector of l shares of the secret µ according to Π.
The share (M−→v )i belongs to party ρ(i).
It has been noted in [12] that every LSSS also enjoys the linear reconstruction
property. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for access structure A. Let A be an autho-
rized set, and define I ⊆ {1, ..., l} as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ A}. Then the vector (1, 0,
..., 0) is in the span of rows of matrix M indexed by I, and there exist constants
{wi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, for any valid shares {vi} of a secret µ according to Π,
we have
∑
i∈I wivi = µ. These constants {wi} can be found in polynomial time
with respect to the size of the share-generating matrix M [4].
Boolean Formulas [12]. Access policies can also be described in terms of
monotonic boolean formulas. LSSS access structures are more general, and can be
derived from representations as boolean formulas. There are standard techniques
to convert any monotonic boolean formula into a corresponding LSSS matrix.
The boolean formula can be represented as an access tree, where the interior
nodes are AND and OR gates, and the leaf nodes correspond to attributes. The
number of rows in the corresponding LSSS matrix will be the same as the number
of leaf nodes in the access tree.
2.3 Binary Tree
We recall the definitions related to binary tree in [5, 19]. Denote BT by a binary
tree with N leaves corresponding to N users. Let root be the root node of the
tree BT. If θ is a leaf node, then Path(θ) denotes the set of nodes on the path
from θ to root, which includes both θ and root. If θ is a non-leaf node, then θl,
θr denote left and right child of θ. Assume that nodes in the tree are uniquely
encoded as strings, and the tree is defined by all of its nodes descriptions. The
KUNodes algorithm is used to compute the minimal set of nodes for which key
update needs to be published so that only the non-revoked users at time period
t are able to decrypt the ciphertexts. This algorithm takes a binary tree BT, a
revocation list rl and a time period t as the input, and it outputs a set of nodes,
which is the minimal set of nodes in BT such that none of the nodes in rl with
corresponding time period at or before t (users revoked at or before t) have any
ancestor (or, themselves) in the set, and all other leaf nodes (corresponding to
non-revoked users) have exactly one ancestor (or, themselves) in the set. The
KUNodes algorithm works as follows: it firstly marks all the ancestors of the
revoked nodes as revoked, and then it outputs all the non-revoked children of
revoked nodes. We give a formal definition as follows.
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KUNodes(BT, rl, t)
X,Y ← ∅.
∀ (θi, ti) ∈ rl, if ti ≤ t, then add Path(θi) to X.
∀ x ∈ X, if xl /∈ X, then add xl to Y ; if xr /∈ X, then add xr to Y.
If Y = ∅, then add root to Y.
Return Y.
3 System Architecture and Security Model
In this section, we describe the system architecture and formal security definition
of attribute-based encryption with granular revocation.
3.1 Framework
An ABE-GR scheme involves three entities: attribute authority (AA), data own-
ers and data users, where the algorithms run by these parties are described as
follows.
– GSetup(1λ) → (par, msk). Taking a security parameter λ as the input, this
algorithm outputs the public parameter par and the master private key msk.
This algorithm is run by the AA.
– ASetup(par, Ai) → (PKAi , SKAi , rli, sti). Taking the public parameter par
and an attribute Ai as the input, this algorithm outputs a public and private
key pair (PKAi , SKAi) along with an initially empty revocation list rli and a
state sti. This algorithm is run by the AA.
– UserKG(par, msk, id) → (skid, pkid). Taking the public parameter par, the
master private key msk and an identity id as the input, this algorithm outputs
a private and public user-key pair (skid, pkid) for user id. This algorithm is
run by the AA.
– PrivKG(par, SKAi , pkid, sti)→ (pkAiid , sti). Taking the public parameter par,
the private key SKAi , a pubic user-key pkid and a state sti as the input, this
algorithm outputs a private attribute-key pkAiid and an updated state sti for
user id possessing an attribute Ai. This algorithm is run by the AA.
– TKeyUp(par, SKAi , t, rli, sti) → (ku(i)t , sti). Taking the public parameter
par, the private key SKAi , a time period t, a revocation list rli and a state sti
as the input, this algorithm outputs the key update information ku
(i)
t and an
updated state sti. This algorithm is run by the AA.
– DecKG(par, pkAiid , tku
(i)
t )→ dk(i)id,t. Taking the public parameter par, a private
attribute-key pkAiid and the key update information tku
(i)
t as the input, this
algorithm outputs a decryption key dk
(i)
id,t for user id at time period t. This
algorithm is run by each data user.
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– Encrypt(par, (M, ρ), {PKAi}, t, M) → CT. Taking the public parameter
par, an access structure (M, ρ), a set of public keys {PKAi} for relevant
attributes, a time period t and a message M as the input, this algorithm
outputs a ciphertext CT. This algorithm is run by each data owner, and CT
will be stored to the cloud.
– Decrypt(par, pkid, skid, {dk(i)id,t}, CT) → M/⊥. Taking the public parameter
par, a public and private user-key pair (pkid, skid), a collection of decryption
keys {dk(i)id,t} corresponding to the same id and a ciphertext CT as the input,
this algorithm outputs a message M when the collection of attributes {Ai}
satisfies the access matrix corresponding to the ciphertext or a failure symbol
⊥. This algorithm is run by each data user.
– Revoke(id, Ai, t, rli, sti) → rli. Taking an attribute Ai of identity id to be
revoked, a time period t, a revocation list rli and a state sti, this algorithm
outputs an updated revocation list rli. This algorithm is run by the AA.
Notes and Comments. Note that in order to create public and private keys, pri-
vate attribute-keys, key update information and decryption keys corresponding
to multiple attributes, the corresponding algorithms ASetup, PrivKG, TKeyUp
and DecKG are extended to take in many attributes by running the “single
attribute” version once for each attribute.
The correctness of an ABE-GR scheme requires that for any security pa-
rameter λ and any message M , if the data user is not revoked at time period
t, and if all the parties follow the described algorithms as above, then we have
Decrypt(par, skid, {dk(i)id,t}, CT) = M if {dk(i)id,t} is a set of decryption keys for
the same identity id over a set of attributes satisfying the access structure of the
ciphertext CT.
3.2 Security Model
Below we describe the security definition of indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attacks, i.e., IND-CPA security, for ABE-GR between an adversary
algorithm A and a challenger algorithm B.
– Setup. Algorithm B runs the GSetup algorithm, and gives the public parameter
par to algorithm A whilst keeps the master private key msk. In addition,
algorithm B runs the ASetup algorithm, and keeps the private keys {SKAi},
initially empty revocation lists {rli} and states {sti} whilst gives algorithm A
the public keys {PKAi}.
– Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues a sequence of queries to algorithm B.
1. Private-User-Key oracle. Algorithm A issues a private user-key query on an
identity id. Algorithm B returns skid by running UserKG(par, msk, id),
and adds (id, pkid) to the user list.
2. Private-Attribute-Key oracle. Algorithm A issues a public attribute-key
query on an identity id with an attribute set {Ai}. Algorithm B returns
{pkAiid } by running UserKG(par, msk, id) (if id does not exist in the user
list), PrivKG(par, SKAi , pkid, sti) for each Ai of id.
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3. Key-Update oracle. Algorithm A issues a key update query on a time period
t. Algorithm B returns {tku(i)t } by running TKeyUp(par, SKAi t, rli, sti)
for each Ai.
4. Decryption-Key oracle. Algorithm A issues a decryption key query on a
time period t and an identity id with an attribute set {Ai}. Algorithm B
returns {dk(i)id,t} by running UserKG(par, msk, id) (if id does not exist in
the user list), PrivKG(par, SKAi , pkid, sti), TKeyUp(par, SKAi , t, rli, sti),
DecKG(par, pkAiid , tku
(i)
t ) on each Ai of id. Note that this oracle cannot be
queried on a time period t which has not been issued to the Key-Update
oracle.
5. Revocation oracle. Algorithm A issues a revocation query on an attribute
Ai of identity id and a time period t. Algorithm B runs Revoke(id, t, rli,
sti) and outputs an updated revocation list rli. Note that this oracle cannot
be queried on a time period t if a key update query has been issued on t.
– Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M∗0 , M∗1 of the same size, an
access structure (M∗, ρ∗) and a time period t∗ with the following constraint.
Denote IM∗,ρ∗ = {I1, ..., Iχ} by a set of minimum subsets of attributes sat-
isfying (M∗, ρ∗). For each id, if algorithm A asks for a collection of private
attribute-keys on an attribute set covering an Ij ∈ IM∗,ρ∗ (j ∈ [1, χ]), then
(1) the revocation oracle must be queried on some tuple (id, t, Ai) where t
happens at or before t∗ and Ai ∈ Ij (j ∈ [1, χ]), and (2) the Decryption-
Key oracle cannot be queried on (id, t, {Ai}) for any t = t∗ and Ij ⊆ {Ai}
(j ∈ [1, χ]). Algorithm B randomly chooses γ ∈ {0, 1}∗, runs Encrypt(par,
(M∗, ρ∗), {PKAi}, t∗, M∗γ ) to obtain the challenge ciphertext CT∗, and sends
CT∗ to algorithm A.
– Phase 2. Algorithm A continues issuing a sequence of queries to algorithm B
as in Phase 1, following the restriction defined in the Challenge phase.
– Guess. Algorithm A makes a guess γ′ for γ, and it wins the game if γ′ = γ.
The advantage of algorithm A in this game is defined to be Pr[γ = γ′]− 1/2.
We say that an ABE-GR scheme is secure under the IND-CPA security model
if all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in the security parameter λ. In addition, an ABE-GR scheme is said
to be selectively secure under the IND-CPA security model if an Init stage is
added before the Setup phase where algorithm A commits to the challenge access
structure (M∗, ρ∗) which it attempts to attack.
Remarks. Note that our security definition is different from those presented
in previous revocable ABE schemes. The definitions in [1, 20, 8] do not take a
realistic threat called decryption key exposure attacks [22]6 into consideration,
while our model allows an additional Decryption-Key oracle to cover such kind
of attacks so that no information of the plaintext is revealed from a ciphertext
even if all (short-term) decryption keys of different time periods are exposed.
6 This does not contradict the security proofs of these schemes, because such attack
is excluded from their security models.
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4 Attribute-Based Encryption with Granular Revocation
In this section, we present two ABE-GR constructions and their security analysis.
Also, we compare them with several existing revocable ABE schemes.
4.1 Basic Construction
Assume that the attribute space is Zp, the time space is Zp, and the message
space is G1. Our basic attribute-based encryption scheme supporting granular
revocation is composed of the following algorithms, which is built upon the CP-
ABE scheme presented in [24].
– GSetup. This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as the input. It randomly
chooses a group G of prime order p with g ∈ G being the corresponding gen-
erator, and defines a bilinear map eˆ : G×G→ G1. Additionally, it randomly
chooses u, h ∈ G, a, α ∈ Zp. Define a function F to map an element y in Zp
to an element in G by F (y) = uyh. The public parameter is par = (g, ga, u,
h, eˆ(g, g)α). The master private key is msk = α.
– ASetup. This algorithm takes the public parameter par and an attribute i as
the input. It randomly chooses αi ∈ Zp, and computes PKAi = gαi . Let rli
be an empty list storing revoked users and BTi be a binary tree with at least
N leaf nodes. It outputs the public key PKAi along with rli and sti where sti
is a state which is set to be BTi, and keeps αi as the private key SKAi .
– UserKG. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, the master private
key msk and an identity id as the input. It randomly chooses β ∈ Zp, and
outputs a private and public user-key pair (skid, pkid) = (g
α(ga)β , gβ).
– PrivKG. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, the private key SKAi ,
a public user-key pkid, an attribute Ai with a private key SKAi and a state
sti as the input. It firstly chooses an undefined leaf node θ
(i) from the binary
tree BTi, and stores id in this node. Then, for each node x
(i) ∈ Path(θ(i)), it
runs as follows.
1. It fetches gi,x from the node x
(i). If x(i) is undefined, it randomly chooses
gi,x ∈ G, and computes P (i)x = (gβ/gi,x)αi . It stores gi,x in the node x(i).
2. It outputs the private attribute-key pkAiid = {x(i), P (i)x }x(i)∈Path(θ(i)) and an
updated state sti.
– TKeyUp. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, a private key SKAi ,
a time period t, a revocation list rli, and a state BTi as the input. For all x
(i)
∈ KUNodes(BTi, rli, t), it fetches gi,x7 from the node x. Then, it randomly
chooses si,x ∈ Zp, and computes
Q
(i)
x,1 = gi,x
αi · F (t)si,x , Q(i)x,2 = gsi,x .
It outputs ku
(i)
t = {x(i), Q(i)x,1, Q(i)x,2}x(i)∈KUNodes(BTi, rli, t) as the key update
information.
7 Note that gi,x is always predefined in the PrivKG algorithm.
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– DecKG. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, a private attribute-
key pkAiid and the key update information tku
(i)
t as the input. It parses each
pkAiid as {x(i), P (i)x }x(i)∈I , tku(i)t as {x(i), Q(i)x,1, Q(i)x,2}x(i)∈J for some set of
nodes I = Path(θ(i)), J = KUNodes(BTi, rli, t). If I ∩ J = ∅, it returns ⊥.
Otherwise, for any x(i) ∈ I ∩ J , it randomly chooses s′i,x ∈ Zp, and computes
dk
(i)
1 = P
(i)
x ·Q(i)x,1 · F (t)s
′
i,x = pkid
αi · F (t)si,x+s′i,x ,
dk
(i)
2 = Q
(i)
x,2 · gs
′
i,x = gsi,x+s
′
i,x .
It outputs the decryption key dk
(i)
id,t = (dk
(i)
1 , dk
(i)
2 ).
– Encrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, an LSSS access struc-
ture (M, ρ), a set of public keys {PKAi} for relevant attributes, a time period
t and a message M as the input. Let M be an l×n matrix. It randomly chooses
a vector −→v = (µ, y2, ..., yn)⊥ ∈ Znp . These values will be used to share the
encryption exponent µ. For i = 1 to l, it calculates vi = Mi · −→v where Mi is
the i-th row of M. Also, it randomly chooses µ, µ1, ..., µk ∈ Zp, and computes
C0 = eˆ(g, g)
αµ ·M, C(i)2 = (ga)vi · (PKρ(i))−µi ,
C1 = g
µ, C
(i)
3 = g
µi , C
(i)
4 = F (t)
µi .
It outputs the ciphertext CT = ((M, ρ), t, C0, C1, {C(i)2 , C(i)3 , C(i)4 }i∈[i,l]).
– Decrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, a public and private
user pair (pkid, skid), a set of decryption keys {dk(i)id,t} and a ciphertext CT
as the input. Suppose that {Ai} associated with {pkAiid } satisfies the access
structure (M, ρ). Let I be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ {Ai}}. Denote by
{wi ∈ Zp}i∈I a set of constants such that if {vi} are valid shares of any secret
µ according to M, then
∑
i∈I wivi = µ. It computes
eˆ(C1, skid)
∏
i∈I eˆ(C
(i)
4 , dk
(i)
2 )
(
∏
i∈I eˆ(C
(i)
2 , pkid)eˆ(C
(i)
3 , dk
(i)
1 ))
wi
= eˆ(g, g)αµ,
and then cancels out this value from C0 to obtain the plaintext M .
– Revoke. This algorithm takes an attribute Ai of identity id, a time period t, a
revocation list rli and a state sti as the input. For all the nodes x
(i) associated
with identity id, it adds (x(i), t) to rli, and outputs the updated rli.
Theorem 1. Under the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption, our basic ABE-
GR scheme is selectively IND-CPA secure.
Proof. In the proof, it is assumed that if an adversary has issued a private user-
key query on an identity id, and a private attribute-key query on attributes
{Ai} of this identity id satisfying the challenge access structure (M∗, ρ∗), then
at least one attribute in each set of minimum attributes satisfying (M∗, ρ∗) of
this identity id is revoked at or before the challenge time period t∗. We detail
the proof in the full version of this paper due to the space limit8.
8 Please contact the author for the full version.
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4.2 Construction with Improved Efficiency
The main drawback in our previous construction lies in that all non-revokes
data users need to periodically update their decryption keys. To remove such
cumbersome workloads from data users, we give another ABE-GR scheme, which
we call a server-aided ABE-GR scheme. Our method is to introduce an untrusted
server to the basic ABE-GR scheme such that the server will help data users
with the workloads in key update stage. The algorithms of our server-aided ABE-
GR scheme mostly follow those in the basic ABE-GR scheme except with two
differences.
– Firstly, the user-key generation algorithm is replaced by two algorithms, where
one is run by each data user himself/herself called UUserKG, and the other
one is run by the AA called AUserKG. The UUserKG algorithm outputs a
public and private user-user-key pair. On input a public user-user-key and the
master private key of the AA, the AUserKG algorithm outputs a public and
private authority-user-key pair and publicly transmits them to the server.
– Secondly, the decryption algorithm is divided into two parts, of which one
is run by the server called SDecrypt using the public and private authority-
user-keys and decryption key, and the other one is run the data user called
UDecrypt with the private user-user-key. The SDecrypt algorithm takes a
ciphertext as the input, and outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext. The
UDecrypt algorithm takes a partially decrypted ciphertext as the input, and
outputs the plaintext.
Assume that for each data user, the server keeps a list of tuples (identity,
attributes, public and private authority-user-keys, a set of private attribute-
keys), i.e., (id, {Ai}, (pkid, skid), {pkAiid }). We detail the concrete construction
as follows.
– GSetup. The same as that in the basic ABE-GR construction.
– ASetup. The same as that in the basic ABE-GR construction.
– UUserKG. The data user id randomly chooses τ ∈ Zp, and outputs a public
and private user-user-key pair (pk′id, sk
′
id) = (g
τ , τ).
– AUserKG. The AA randomly chooses β ∈ Zp, and outputs a private and
public authority-user-key pair (skid, pkid) = ((pk
′
id)
α(ga)β , gβ). The AA will
publicly send (skid, pkid) to the server.
– PrivKG. The same as that in the basic ABE-GR construction. The AA will
publicly send pkAiid to the server.
– TKeyUp. The same as that in the basic ABE-GR construction. The AA will
publicly send ku
(i)
t to the server.
– DecKG. The same as that in the basic ABE-GR construction except that it
is run by the server rather than the data user.
– Encrypt. The same as that in the basic ABE-GR construction.
– SDecrypt. Given the private authority-user-key and decryption key, the server
computes
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C ′0 =
eˆ(C1, skid)
∏
i∈I eˆ(C
(i)
4 , dk
(i)
2 )
(
∏
i∈I eˆ(C
(i)
2 , pkid)eˆ(C
(i)
3 , dk
(i)
1 ))
wi
= eˆ(pk′id, g)
αµ,
and sends CT′ = (id, C0, C ′0) to the data user.
– UDecrypt. The data user computes M = C0/(C
′
0)
1
τ using the private user-
user-key.
– Revoke. The same as that in the basic ABE-GR construction.
Remarks. It is worth noticing that the server-aided ABE-GR scheme has an
edge over the basic ABE-GR one in both storage and computation overheads.
Firstly, each data user in the server-aided ABE-GR construction only needs to
keep one short private key, while in the basic ABE-GR one each data user keeps a
private key of large size (depending on the size of attribute sets he/she owns and
the total number of data users allowed in the system). Secondly, each data user in
the server-aided ABE-GR system only needs to perform one exponentiation and
no pairing computation to decrypt a ciphertext, while in the basic ABE-GR one
each data user needs to perform many exponentiation and pairing computations.
Thirdly, there is no secure channel required in the server-aided ABE-GR scheme
for private key transmission, but the AA in the basic ABE-GR one needs to send
the private user-key and attribute-keys to each data user via a secure channel.
Theorem 2. Under the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption, our server-
aided ABE-GR scheme is selectively IND-CPA secure.
Proof. In the proof, it is assumed that if an adversary has issued a private user-
user-key query, a private authority-user-key query, and a private attribute-key on
attributes {Ai} satisfying the challenge access structure (M∗, ρ∗) on an identity
id, then at least one attribute in each set of minimum attributes satisfying (M∗,
ρ∗) of this identity id is revoked at or before the challenge time period t∗. The
proof is similar to that in Theorem 1, and we detail it in the full version of this
paper due to the space limit.
4.3 System Analysis
To the best of our knowledge, in addition to our work in this paper, [5], [1],
[20] and [25] are also about constructions on revocable ABE built from the
standard bilinear maps in the prime-order groups. This paper aims to achieve
granular revocation in a CP-ABE system such that the AA can selectively revoke
specific attributes of data users. In [5], a KP-ABE scheme with user revocation
is proposed using indirect revocation where the AA enables the revocation by
forcing revoked users to be unable to update their keys. A KP-ABE system
with hybrid user revocation is raised in [1] which allows a data owner to select
to use either direct or indirect revocation mode when encrypting a message. A
generic way to build ABE schemes supporting dynamic credentials is provided in
[20], where the AA indirectly accomplishes revocation by stopping updating the
keys for revoked data users. In [25], a semi-trusted server is asked to share the
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Table 1: Comparison of properties among revocable ABE (RABE) schemes.
RABE RABE RABE RABE Basic Server
in [5] in [1] in [25] in [20] ABE-GR -aided
ABE-GR
Revocation Indirect Indirect Direct Indirect Indirect Indirect
Mode & Direct
Selective No No No No Yes Yes
Revocation
Type of KP-ABE KP-ABE CP- KP-ABE CP-ABE CP-ABE
ABE ABE & CP-ABE
Key Exposure No No No No Yes Yes
Resistance
Secure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Channel
Server NA NA Semi- NA NA Untrust
trust
Size of Key O(R log(N
R
)) O(R log(N
R
)) NA O(R log(N
R
)) O(mR· O(mR·
Updates log(N
R
)) log(N
R
))
Size of Key O(l logN) O(l logN) O(1) O(l logN) O(k logN) O(1)
Stored & O(k logN)
by User
Data User’s ≥ 2(E + P) ≥ 3E + 4P E ≥ E + P ≥ E + 4P E
Computation
Overhead
decryption capability with data users, and thus the server can indirectly revoke
a data user by terminating the decryption for this data user.
Denote “NA” by the meaning of not-applicable. Let R be the number of
revoked users, N be the number of all data users, l be the number of attributes
presented in the access structure, k be the size of attribute set possed by each
data user, and m be the maximum size allowed for k. In Table 1, we compare
our revocable systems with the revocable ABE constructions in [5], [1], [25] and
[20], where “E” and “P” denote the calculation of exponentiation and pairing,
respectively. It is straightforward to see that our notion of ABE-GR is the first
that achieves selective revocation while preserving desirable properties in terms
of both security and efficiency. Additionally, our server-aided ABE-GR scheme
greatly reduces the storage and computation overhead incurred to each data user
with the help of an untrusted server.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a notion called attribute-based encryption with
granular revocation (ABE-GR) to achieve selective revocation, where each data
user’s attributes (or credentials) can be selectively revoked. To our knowledge,
there are few works on such a revocation mechanism, and most of the existing
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revocable ABE schemes aim to revoke a data user from the system such that
a revoked data user will become underprivileged to all (newly) encrypted data
in the system. Motivated by the key separation technique in distributed ABE
[17] where one single AA’s workload is split across several AAs and each AA is
responsible for at least one specific attribute, we equipped a normal ABE system
with a similar technique such that each data user’s attribute-keys are composed
of key elements (corresponding to different attributes) generated separately but
essentially linkable to each other. Thus, each data user’s attributes can be se-
lectively revoked by the AA, and a data user can be revoked from the system
by separately revoking all of his/her attributes. After the description of security
model for SR-ABE, we presented a basic construction of ABE-GR, which utilizes
the binary tree data structure to reduce the workload of the AA. Then, we fur-
ther improved the efficiency by introducing an untrusted server to the proposed
ABE-GR scheme to help data users with the workloads incurred in key update
and decryption, which we call server-aided ABE-GR. In addition, we formally
proved the security of our ABE-GR and server-aided ABE-GR schemes, and
compared them with other concrete constructions of revocable ABE that are
related to our work.
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